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Abstract.  This paper presents an agent-based simulator 
designed for analyzing agent market strategies based on a 
complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviours, 
preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk 
preferences. The system includes agents that are capable of 
improving their performance with their own experience, by 
adapting to the market conditions. In the simulated market 
agents interact in several different ways and may joint together 
to form coalitions. In this paper we address multi-agent 
coalitions to analyse Distributed Generation in Electricity 
Markets. 12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Market players and regulators are very interested in foreseeing 
market behaviour: regulators to test rules before they are 
implemented and detect market inefficiencies that should not 
encourage strategic behaviours that might reduce market 
performance; market players to understand market behaviour and 
operate in order to maximize profits. Simulation and Artificial 
Intelligence techniques may be very helpful under this context.  
Multi-agent based simulation is particularly well fitted to 
analyze dynamic and adaptive systems with complex interactions 
among constituents [1]. Unlike traditional tools, agent based 
simulation does not postulate a single decision maker with a 
single objective for the entire system. Rather, agents, 
representing the different independent entities in electronic 
markets, are allowed to establish their own objectives and 
decision rules. Moreover, as the simulation progresses, agents 
can adapt their strategies, based on the success or failure of 
previous efforts. 
We present a multi-agent market simulator designed for 
analyzing agent market strategies based on a complete 
understanding of buyer and seller behaviours, preference models 
and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences. Each 
market participant has its own business objectives, and decision 
model. The results of the negotiations between agents are 
analyzed by data mining algorithms in order to extract 
knowledge that gives agents feedback to improve their strategies. 
The extracted knowledge will be used to set up probable 
scenarios, analyzed by means of simulation and game theory 
decision criteria. 
We intend to apply this platform to different market types, 
taking into account some previous work of our research group, 
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where two different simulation platforms have already been 
developed, namely ISEM – Intelligent System for Electronic 
MarketPlaces [2], and MASCEM – Multi-Agent Simulator for 
Competitive  Electricity Markets[3]. 
ISEM focuses specially on markets with finite time horizon. 
This simulator was selected as a worldwide case study in 
simulation of negotiation agents [4], while MASCEM focus 
particularly on market mechanisms usually found in liberalized 
electricity markets and was selected as a worldwide case study 
of agents technology applied to markets [5]. 
Our proposal is a Market Simulator that will act as a kind of 
What-if tool, trying to analyze what may occur if some decision 
is taken. However, some additional intelligence need to be 
placed in the system, otherwise we will have a kind of 
combinatorial explosion, since many scenarios need to be 
analyzed. Moreover, the Market Simulator will be used as the 
engine of a Market Participant (Seller or Client) in order to 
suggest him/her about the actions to have in the market.  
Entities from real markets can use our tool to test several 
different negotiation mechanisms, different behaviours, 
strategies and risk preferences, and to analyze the future market 
evolution and other entities expected reactions. Our tool may 
also be used to understand the implications of agents’ coalitions 
on markets.  
Electricity Markets are an important area of application of our 
research. In this paper we present our developments in studying 
the increase in Distributed Generation, and its market influence, 
by means of agents’ coalitions. 
In a general way the formation of coalition can be seen as an 
enterprise example of the constitution of a social net, where the 
several elements of this net establish negotiation processes in 
order that a formal structure, with the capacity to supply goods 
and services to the society, can emerge. Each element of the 
coalition is not able to supply the services and goods with the 
desirable amount and quality, but the coalition presents itself as a 
credible structure to the eyes of the potentials consumers, that is, 
the structure (coalition) thus created worth more than the sum of 
its parts.  
This article illustrates the constitution of coalitions for an 
important problem, subject to enormous transformations and 
with clear social and strategically impact: the establishment of 
electric energy supply contracts through competitive markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
outlines the multi-agent model; section 3 addresses the 
negotiation mechanisms; section 4 explains the use of data 
mining in the scope of our tool; section 5 addresses agents 
strategic behaviour; and section 6 explores agents coalition to 
represent virtual power producers in the study of distributed 
generation penetration on electricity markets. 
2 MULTI-AGENT MODEL 
Our Simulator facilitates agent meeting and matching, besides 
supporting the negotiation model. In order to have results and 
feedback to improve the negotiation models and consequently 
the behaviour of user agents, we simulate a series of negotiation 
periods, { }n,...,2,1D =  , where each one is composed by a fixed 
interval of time  { }m,...,1,0T =  . Furthermore, each agent has a 
deadline DD
Agt
max ∈ to achieve its business objectives. At a 
particular negotiation period, each agent has an objective that 
specifies its intention to buy or sell a particular good or service 
and on what conditions. 
The available agents can establish their own objectives and 
decision rules. Moreover, they can adapt their strategies as the 
simulation progresses on the basis of previous effort’s successes 
or failures. The simulator probes the conditions and the effects of 
market rules, by simulating the participant’s strategic behaviour. 
The simulator was developed based on “A Model for 
Developing a MarketPlace with Software Agents (MoDeMA)” 
[4]. The following steps compose MoDeMA:: 
• Marketplace model definition, that permits doing 
transactions according to the Consumer Buying Behaviour 
Model; 
• Identification of the different participants, and the possible 
interactions between them; 
• Ontology specification, that identifies and represents items 
on transaction; 
• Agents architecture specification, and information flows 
between each agents module; 
• Knowledge Acquisition, defining the process that 
guarantees the agent the knowledge to act on pursuit of its 
role; 
• Negotiation Model, defining the negotiation mechanisms to 
be used; 
• Negotiation Protocol, specification of each negotiation 
mechanism rules; 
• Negotiation Strategies, specification and development of 
several negotiation strategies; 
• Knowledge Discovery, identification and gathering of 
market knowledge to support agents’ strategic behaviour. 
Multi-agent model includes a market administrator, buyers, 
sellers, traders and a market operator.  
The market administrator agent has two main functions: 
coordinator and knowledge provider. On one hand it coordinates 
the simulated market and ensures that it functions correctly, 
according to market mechanisms and established rules. On the 
other hand, it plays the role of “power” agent, since it has access 
to market knowledge, which contains information about the 
organisational and operational rules of the market, as well as 
information about all different running agents, their capabilities 
and historical information. The market previsions and agent 
behaviour models are obtained through data mining algorithms, 
using data resulting from agent negotiations that support agents’ 
market strategies. 
Since we intend to cover several negotiation mechanisms, our 
model also includes a market operator agent, responsible to 
support negotiations based on an auction mechanism. 
Seller and buyer agents are the two key players in the market, so 
we devote special attention to them, particularly to their business 
objectives and strategies to reach them. In order to be 
competitive in today’s economic markets, buyer and seller 
agents need not only to be efficient in their business field, but 
also to be able to quickly react and adapt to new environments as 
well as to interact with other available entities. The control 
architecture adopted for the design of those agents meet these 
requirements, having a similar structure but with a kind of 
symmetrical behaviour (due to their antagonistic business 
objectives). 
3 NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS 
As a decision support tool, our simulator includes several types 
of negotiation mechanisms to let the user test them and learn the 
best way to negotiate in each one. So, we include bilateral 
contracts and a Pool, centralized mechanism based on an 
auction, and regulated by a market operator. Both types of 
negotiation may exist at the same time: Mixed Market. These 
implies each agent must decide whether to, and how to, 
participate in each market type. 
Let Agtb denote the buyer agent, Agts the seller agent and let   
[ ]maxmin , PiPi denote the range of values for price that are 
acceptable for agents. 
A seller agent has the range [ ]maxmin , PsiPsi , which denotes the 
scale of values that are comprised of the minimum value that the 
seller is disposed to sell to the optimal value. 
A buyer agent has the range [ ]maxmin , PbiPbi , which denotes 
the scale of values that are comprised of the optimal value to buy 
to the maximum value. 
3.1 Bilateral Contracts 
In bilateral contracting buyer agents are looking for sellers that 
can provide them the desired products at the best price. We 
adopt what is basically an alternating protocol [6]. 
Negotiation starts when a buyer agent sends a request for 
proposal. In response, a seller agent analyses its own 
capabilities, current availability, and past experiences and 
formulates a proposal. 
Sellers can formulate two kinds of proposals: a proposal for 
the product requested; or a proposal for a related product, 
according to the buyer preference model. 
DT
AgtbAgtsiPPg →
 represents the proposal offered by the seller 
agent Agts  to the buyer agent Agtb  at time Τ, at the 
negotiation period D for a specific product. 
The buyer agent evaluates the proposals received with an 
algorithm that calculates the utility for each one, 
Agtb
PPgiU ; if the 
value of 
Agtb
PPgiU
 for 
DT
AgtbAgtsiPPg →
 at time Τ  is greater than the 
value of the counter-proposal that the buyer agent will formulate 
for the next time Τ, in the same negotiation period D, then the 
buyer agent accepts the offer and negotiation ends successfully 
in an agreement; otherwise a counter-proposal 
DT
AgtsAgtbiCPg →
 is 
made by the buyer agent to the next time Τ. 
The seller agent will accept a buyer counter-proposal if the 
value of 
Agts
CPgiU
 is greater than the value of the counter-
proposal that the seller agent will formulate for the next timeΤ; 
otherwise the seller agent rejects the counter-proposal. 
On the basis of the bilateral agreements made among market 
players and lessons learned from previous bid rounds, both 
agents revise their strategies for the next negotiation rounds and 
update their individual knowledge module. 
3.2 Pool 
In our simulator, agents also have the possibility of negotiating 
through a Pool, which is a centralized mechanism that functions 
according to an auction mechanism, and is regulated by a market 
operator. We have two different auction mechanisms: a double 
and a single uniform auction. 
The process starts at the market operator, who sends a request 
for participation. The call_for_participation message triggers the 
negotiation process and is delivered to all agents in the simulated 
market. If the agent is interested, or capable, of participating in 
the Pool, it will formulate a bid and send it to the market 
operator, specifying for each requested parameter the value of its 
proposal.  
The process of formulating bids, by buyer and seller agents, is 
related to agent strategies, addressed in detail in section 6. The 
market operator evaluates all the received bids, analyses them 
through the pool auction mechanism, defines the market price 
and accepted bids. Then a reply_bid message is sent to all pool 
participants, specifying the settled market price and if the bid 
was or not accepted and why. 
3.3 Mixed Markets 
The Mixed model combines features of Pools and Bilateral 
Contracts. In this model, a Pool isn’t mandatory, and customers 
can either negotiate an agreement directly with sellers, at the 
pool market price or both.  Agents must decide whether to try or 
not the Pool, whether to keep bilateral negotiations 
simultaneously with Pool negotiations or just after Pool results if 
bids were not accepted. For that agents use their past 
experiences, market knowledge and agents own negotiation 
strategies to support their decisions. 
4 DATA MINING SUPPORT 
The market previsions and agent behaviour models are obtained 
through data mining algorithms, using data resulting from agent 
negotiations that support agents’ market strategies. In practice, 
usually, after a confidential negotiation period, the market 
administrator agent discloses information about past transactions 
and agents’ characteristics (if possible); all agent interactions are 
logged at a transaction level of detail, which provide a rich 
source of business insight that can help to customise the business 
offerings to the needs of the individual buyers. With this 
functionality it is possible to discover sub-groups that behave 
independently and associations between products. For that, our 
market simulator uses clustering, classification and association 
operations. 
To carry out the clustering operation a Two-Step clustering 
algorithm [7] is used to target buyers with similar characteristics 
in the same agent group. Then, to obtain more relevant 
information that describes the consumption patterns of each 
cluster population, a rule-based modelling technique, using C5.0 
classification algorithm, an evolution of C4.5 algorithm [8], is 
used to analyse those clusters and to obtain descriptions based on 
a set of attributes, collected in the individual agents’ knowledge 
module. These models are transferred to the market 
administrator agent and offer a set of market information, such 
as: preferred sellers; preferred marks; favourite products and 
reference prices, which support the process of agents’ strategy 
implementation. 
To discover associations between buyer details and purchases, 
data from multiple agent negotiations are manipulated to create 
“basket” records showing product purchases. This permits the 
observation of the behaviour of each buyer agent. This data is 
combined and manipulated by the “Apriori algorithm” [9], to 
discover associations between buyer details and purchases. The 
best association rules, those with a strong support and 
confidence, are extracted and transferred to the market 
administrator agent. With this kind of knowledge it is possible to 
provide insight into the sellers’ agents about the profiles of buyer 
agents with certain purchase propensities, showing associations 
between products, prices, style, etc. 
After these operations, to get confident data, agents can 
request the services provided by the market administrator agent, 
in order to support their strategic behaviour. Only players with 
more sophisticated behaviour will take advantage of this new 
knowledge; since the user can determine which seller agents 
have access to this facility. The user can also determine if the 
agents’ information will be private or public; public information 
is available to market analysis with the data mining 
functionality. However the market can get knowledge about an 
agents’ behaviour even if they are set as a private information 
agent. This situation occurs, by the simple fact of being on the 
market. 
5 STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS 
5.1 Bilateral Contracts 
Agents use four time-dependent strategies to change their price 
during a negotiation period: Determined, Anxious, Moderate and 
Gluttonous, these strategies depending on both the point in time 
when the agent starts to modify the price and the amount it 
changes. 
Although time-dependent strategies are simple to understand 
and implement [10], they are very important since they allow the 
simulation of important issues such as: emotional aspects and 
different risk behaviours. For example, an agent that gains 
utility, with the time, and has the incentive to reach a late 
agreement (within the remaining time until the end of a 
negotiation period) is considered a strong or patient player; an 
agent that loses utility with time and that tries to reach an early 
agreement is considered a weak or impatient player. 
5.2 Behavior-dependent Strategies 
In this work, we have also used the time-dependent strategies, 
based on the model proposed by S. Fatima [11], to model 
different attitudes towards time, during a negotiation period.  
Agents use behaviour-dependent strategies to adjust 
parameters for the next negotiation period according to the 
results obtained in the previous ones. Buyers and seller agents 
develop their behaviour and strategies based on a combination of 
public information, available through requesting from market 
administrator services; and private information, available only to 
the specific agent at their individual knowledge module. 
For Pool Negotiations we define two different behaviour-
dependent strategies: one called Composed Goal Directed 
(CGD) and another called Adapted Derivative Following (ADF). 
The CGD strategy is based on two consecutive objectives, the 
first one is selling (or buying) all the available (or needed) units, 
and then increase the profit (reduce the payoff). The ADF 
strategy is based on the Derivative Following strategy proposed 
by Greenwald [12]. The ADF strategy adjusts its price by 
looking at the amount of revenue earned in the previous period 
as a result of the previous period’s price change. If the last 
period’s price change produced more revenue per good than the 
previous period, then the strategy makes a similar change in 
price. If the previous change produced less revenue per good, 
then the strategy makes an opposite price change. 
For Bilateral Contracts Negotiations we also have several 
behaviour-dependent strategies. Buyer agents can use two 
complementary behaviour-dependent strategies: the Modified 
Goal Directed for Buyers (MGDB) and the Fragmented Demand 
(FD). The MGDB strategy is an adaptation of CGD for bilateral 
contracts. The FD strategy, adjusts the demand per day by 
attempting to reach the goal of buying its entire needs by the last 
day of the market, and not before, this strategy paces its 
purchases over the market, with the goal of buying all the units 
needed but with less costs. Seller agents can also choose from 
two different behaviour-dependent strategies: the Modified Goal 
Directed for Sellers (MGDS), that adjusts its price by attempting 
to reach the goal of selling the entire inventory by the last day of 
the market, by lowering prices when sales in the previous day 
are low and raising prices when the sales are high; and the 
Derivative Following (DF) strategy weighted by Seller 
Satisfaction (DFWS) or by the Previewed Demand for a specific 
product (DFWPD). The DFWS/PD is based on the ADF 
behaviour weighted by the referred issues. Seller agents can 
obtain these values through requesting for market administrator 
agent support. 
6 AGENTS COALITIONS MODELLING 
VIRTUAL POWER PRODUCERS 
Coalition formation is the coming together of a number of 
distinct, autonomous agents that agree to coordinate and 
cooperate, acting as a coherent grouping, in the performance of a 
specific task. Such coalitions can improve the performance of 
the individual agents and/or the system as a whole. It is an 
important form of interaction in multi-agent systems. 
It has been advocated in e-commerce (where buyers may pool 
their requirements in order to obtain bigger group discounts), in 
grid computing (where multi-institution virtual organizations are 
viewed as being central to coordinated resource sharing and 
problem solving), and in e-business (where agile groupings of 
agents need to be formed in order to satisfy particular market 
niches). In all of these cases, the formation of coalitions aims to 
increase the agents’ abilities to satisfy goals and to maximize 
their individual or the system’s outcomes. 
Most work on coalition formation in multi-agent systems and 
game theory has focus on payoff distribution, where it is usually 
assumed that a coalition structure has been formed, and the 
question is then how to divide the payoff so that the coalition 
structure is stable. In this context, many solutions have been 
proposed based on different stability concepts. Transfer schemes 
have also been developed to transfer non-stable payoff 
distributions to stable ones (while keeping the coalition structure 
unchanged). 
Research is giving attention to the coalition structure 
generation [13], [14]. The work of Shehory and Kraus [15] 
considers a somewhat broader environment, where the coalitions 
can be overlapped but the complexity is reduced by limiting the 
size of the coalitions.  
Some other researchers address both coalition structure 
generation and payoff distribution in competitive environments. 
Ketchpel [16] presents a coalition formation method with cubic 
running time in the number of agents, but his method can neither 
guarantee a bound from the optimal nor stability. Shehory and 
Kraus’s protocol guarantees that if the agents follow it, certain 
stability (kernel-stability) is met. In the same paper, they also 
present an alternative protocol that offers a weaker form of 
stability with polynomial running time. However, in both cases, 
no bound from the optimal is guaranteed.  
More recent research in coalition formation area has also 
begun to pay attention to dynamic environments, where agents 
may enter or leave the coalition formation process and many 
uncertainties are present (e.g. the coalition value is not fixed, but 
it is context-based [17]). 
6.1 Virtual Power Producers 
The aggregation of distributed generation plants gives place to 
the new concept of Virtual Power Producers (VPP). VPPs are 
multi-technology and multi-site heterogeneous entities, being 
relationships among aggregated producers and among VPPs and 
the remaining Electricity Market (EM) agents a key factor for 
their success. An aggregating strategy can enable owners of 
Distributed Generation to gain technical and commercial 
advantages, making profit of the specific advantages of a mix of 
several generation technologies and overcoming serious 
disadvantages of some technologies.  
Any type of generation unit or load may be included: wind 
turbines, photovoltaic, mini turbines, micro-turbine, fuel cells, 
energy storage units, non-controllable loads, controllable loads 
etc. The typical size of single distributed energy resource units 
may range from a few kW to some MW.  
In the scope of a VPP, aggregated producers (AP) can make 
sure their generators are optimally operated and that the power 
that is not consumed in their installation has good chances to be 
sold on the market. At the same time, VPPs will be able to 
commit to a more robust generation profile, raising the value of 
non-dispatchable generation technologies. 
Under this context, VPPs can ensure secure, environmentally 
friendly generation and optimal management of heat, electricity 
and cold and optimal operation and maintenance of electrical 
equipment, including the sale of electricity to the EM. VPPs 
should adopt organization and management methodologies so 
that they can make distributed generation a really profitable 
activity.  
VPPs must be flexible enough to use the advantages of its 
resources (e.g. market-based environmental value in the form of 
pollution and/or carbon credits, renewable energy credits) and 
overcoming their problems and limitations. 
VPPs must identify the characteristics of each of the AP and 
try to optimize the selling activity so that each one delivers the 
biggest possible amount of energy. However, this is not simple 
due to uncertainty of generation associated with the technologies 
that depend from natural resources such as wind, sun, waves or 
water flows.  
So, in order to have VPP able to coexist with other market 
agents, it is necessary that it gets profits and that has credibility 
in the EM. This context must be considered in VPPs 
organization and operation methodologies as their goal is to 
optimize their APs’ profits in this market. 
A successful achievement of VPPs’ goals requires the use of a 
mix of adequate technologies for optimizing and supporting their 
activities. Under this scope agents and multi-agent systems are 
important technologies to adequately simulate EM behaviour and 
gather knowledge to provide decision-support to strategic 
behaviour. Taking into account the already described MASCEM 
characteristics, it can be a valuable framework to test VPP 
functioning under different market mechanisms and concerning 
different market strategic behaviour.  
6. 2 VPP Coalition formation 
From the point of view of the multi-agent system, VPP are seen 
as coalitions of agents, requiring specific procedures for 
coalition formation. Once a coalition is established, it can 
aggregate more agents or even discard some agents. This allows 
modelling all the decision making concerning VPP formation 
and also subsequent aggregation of more producers. 
VPP needs to have an adequate knowledge of each potential 
aggregated producer characteristics. Some of the most important 
characteristics are: 
• Nominal Power: the sum of nominal power installed in each 
producer; 
• Available Power: the power a VPP can buy to the producer; 
• Overload Power: some units may produce overload power 
for limited periods. The VPP may use this power in critical 
situations; 
• Equipment characteristics: information concerning 
producers’ equipment allows the VPP to know the power 
characteristic, reliability, maintenance periods, lifetime, 
relation with external factors, possible variations of the 
energy price in function of the cost of the primary 
resources, etc. 
• Operating limits: for the units which are dependent from 
natural resources, it is possible that the primary resource 
must be below or above of equipment operating limits. This 
must be considered in risk analysis in the generation 
forecast. Usually when the resources forecast is near to the 
minimum machines operating limit the risk is small, but 
when they are near to the maximum limit the risk can be 
enormous; 
• Grid connection characteristics: This is an important aspect 
if it is necessary to pay the losses in the lines; also the 
existence of two or more producers connected to the same 
electric substation should be considered; etc; 
• Historical generation data: the availability of historic 
generation data can enable the VPP to get useful forecasting 
tools. 
On one hand, each VPP classifies the producers according to 
several defined criteria. On the other hand, it establishes the 
goals of VPP formation or of VPP aggregation of more 
producers, according to its operating strategies and to its 
necessities at the moment. Aggregation proposals are then 
elaborated based on the resulting knowledge. Each producer 
decision of participating or not in VPP coalition is dependent on 
agents’ market strategies and risk preference. 
Once the VPP formation process finished, the VPP needs to 
coordinate its operation. The VPP must place bids in the market, 
considering the contracts with producers, the generation forecast, 
the reserves and its market strategy. According to its member 
generation capabilities and consumption needs, for a given 
period, the VPP agent will need to sell or buy electricity. VPP 
agents have the same market interface as Seller or Buyer agents. 
However, as VPPs are themselves a set of other agents, there 
are some preliminary steps to define its bids. Firstly, all the 
capacity available from the different aggregated distributed 
energy resources must be gathered to establish the electricity 
amount to trade on the market. The different generation costs 
must be analyzed to define the interval for envisaged proposals. 
This means VPP agents have a utility function that aggregates all 
the involved units’ characteristics. The analysis of the 
aggregated producers’ proposals will be done according to each 
unit capabilities and costs.  
After the market session, the VPP agent undertakes an 
internal dispatch, analyzing and adjusting its generation and 
reserve to maximize profits. VPP informs the aggregated 
producers about their dispatch. Finally, in function of the 
generation, the used and unused reserve of each producer and the 
established contracts of the VPP fulfilment, the VPP determines 
the producers’ remuneration. The Introduction of VPP models in 
the simulator required to rethink the multi-agent architecture, 
namely in what concerns agent communication [18]. Figure 1 
illustrates the simulator negotiation framework allowing for 
VPPs. 
 
 
Figure 1. Negotiation framework regarding VPPs 
 
Considering each VPP as a multi-agent system allows an 
interesting approach from both the performance and the 
conceptual point of view. In order to develop a computational 
implementation of this conceptual architecture, each VPP has to 
have its own facilitator. This means that each VPP has now its 
own facilitator that allows it to communicate with all the 
producers that are part of this coalition or intend to join it, 
independently from the rest of the simulation. 
6. 3 VPP Case Study 
In fact, our simulator is already being used to study several 
scenarios from real electricity markets, namely from real data 
obtained from OMEL, the Spanish Electricity Market. The data 
was analyzed by means of statistical and data mining techniques 
in order to have an illustrative scenario although with a limited 
number of agents. In this example we have a scenario with 7 
buyers, 5 sellers, and 2 VPPs. Concerning VPPs, there is a VPP 
with 3 aggregated producers, all of which have wind farms; and 
another with 4 aggregated producers (1 photovoltaic plant, 1 
wind farm, 1 co-generation and 1 mini-hydro). Figure 2 
illustrates market transactions by agent. 
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Figure 2 Energy market transactions by seller 
 
Market results showed a coherent behaviour which gives us 
confidence on using our simulator to test several VPP 
configurations under different scenarios in order to draw 
conclusions about VPP advantages and drawbacks for the 
involved agents and for the market. 
7 CONCLUSIONS  
In the near future, agent market strategies will be a common 
competitive manoeuvre for electronic markets. Market 
participant’s strategic behaviour is very significant in the context 
of competition. In addition, the availability of new market 
knowledge obtained with data mining algorithms is vital for 
supporting marketing and sales. Also important is the 
development of agent-based tools that will help in understanding 
what kinds of electronic market strategies are appropriate. Agent 
coalitions is an important issue that can also be analysed by 
means of our tool. This is already being important to study and 
obtain conclusions about distributed generation penetration into 
electricity markets.  
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